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JURORS, JUDGES, AND THE MISTREATMENT
OF RISK BY THE COURTS
W. KIP VISCUSI*
ABSTRACT
A sample of almost 500 jury-eligible citizens considered a series of experimental
situations involving accidents. The juror sample did not properly apply negligence
rules, as their errors were particularly great for low-probability, large-loss cases.
They also penalized corporations for undertaking corporate risk analyses that seek
to trade off cost versus risk reduction benefits. Jurors' damages assessments were
also more prone to error than were responses by a sample of state judges. Judges
were less prone to erroneous risk beliefs and less subject to the zero-risk mentality.
I. INTRODUCTION
A SUBSTANTIAL literature has documented the difficulties affecting
choices under uncertainty. Risk beliefs may be biased, and subsequent deci-
sions may be in error as well. These errors are usually not random but in-
stead follow many quite systematic patterns. By analyzing the pattern in
such biases and heuristics, it becomes possible to predict how people will
tend to err in other risk decisions.
These errors are not restricted to people's private decisions. Many recent
analyses have suggested that jurors have substantial difficulty in thinking
* John F. Cogan, Jr., Professor of Law and Economics and Director of the Program on
Empirical Legal Studies at Harvard Law School. This research was supported in part by the
Harvard Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, the Sheldon Seevak Research Fund,
and a grant to the author from the Exxon Corporation. Jahn Hakes and a referee provided
valuable comments. A draft of this article was presented at the Harvard Law and Economics
Workshop.
See, for example, the prospect theory model of Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979). W. Kip
Viscusi, Prospective Reference Theory: Towards an Explanation of the Paradoxes, 2 J.
Risk & Uncertainty 235 (1989), and W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk Policy (1998), provide
a normative Bayesian approach that predicts many of the anomalies that are incorporated into
the prospect theory framework. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Be-
havioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998), links many of these
anomalies to legal contexts.
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about accident cases as well.2 Determination of liability and assessments of
damages may be fraught with error. Moreover, these biases are not random
and in some cases reflect patterns of behavior established in the literature
more generally.
Most of these studies have used experimental scenarios to investigate po-
tential errors in jury judgments. By controlling the background information
concerning the accident context, it is possible to eliminate the complicating
influence of other factors present in actual cases. Moreover, by varying the
case descriptions across respondents, the incremental effect of specific as-
pects of the case can be isolated. Most of these studies focus on individual
respondents, as does this one, because of cost considerations. However,
studies of group decision making have generated similar results that in
some cases show that groups err more in their judgments than do individu-
als.3 This article is in the same vein of experimental work designed to ex-
plore how prospective jurors think about accident cases.
Risk judgments of various kinds are central to jurors' implementation of
legal rules. Applying negligence criteria requires that jurors assess the ade-
quacy of risk-cost trade-offs. Similarly, risk utility tests, assessments of the
adequacy of a product design, and similar matters all require that jurors be
able to make sensible judgments once presented with appropriate risk evi-
dence. Assessments of whether the defendant's conduct led to willful and
reckless imposition of risks on others and consequently merits punitive
damages likewise require that jurors be able to perceive the magnitude of
the risk, determine how corporations and other defendants should have re-
sponded in that context, and evaluate the extent of the shortfall in the level
of precautionary behavior.
To explore such issues, this article will use an original sample of almost
500 jury-eligible citizens. Each of these participants considered a detailed
series of questions regarding risk beliefs, willingness to bear risks, and a
2 See, among others, Reid Hastie, David Schkade, & John Payne, A Study of Juror and
Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, 22 Law & Hum.
Behav. 287 (1998); Reid Hastie, David Schkade, & John Payne, Juror Judgments in Civil
Cases: Effects of Plaintiff's Requests and Plaintiff's Identity on Punitive Damage Awards,
23 Law & Hum. Behav. 445 (1999); Reid Hastie, David Schkade, & John Payne, Juror Judg-
ments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages, 23
Law & Hum. Behav. 597 (1999); Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, & Cass R. Sunstein,
Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. Risk &
Uncertainty 49 (1998); David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, & Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating
about Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1139 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel
Kahneman, & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law), 107 Yale L. J. 2071 (1998); and Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, &
Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal Deterrence? 29 J. Legal Stud. 237 (2000).
' See, for example, the punitive damages study in Schkade, Sunstein, & Kahneman, supra
note 2.
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wide variety of risk judgments that parallel those arising in courtroom situa-
tions. Moreover, since many of the cases considered punitive damages, par-
ticipants also received general instructions regarding the award of punitive
damages that covered the principal justifications for punitive damages in
jury instructions:
Several of the questions deal with punitive damages for safety decisions. As you
may recall, courts may award punitive damages for conduct that is reckless. A com-
pany is reckless if it is conscious of a grave danger or risk of harm, it evaluated the
danger, it disregarded the risk when deciding how to act, and its conduct involved a
gross deviation from the level of care an ordinary person would use. In the punitive
damages cases discussed below, courts will separately award compensatory dam-
ages to meet the income losses associated with the accident.
Several tests of the rationality of juror behavior are possible. First, do
jurors perform well with respect to legal norms, such as legal rules for neg-
ligence doctrines? Second, do jurors perform well in objective risk decision
terms; that is, are their risk beliefs accurate? Third, compared with a sample
of judges, how do the jurors fare? Many of these scenarios were the same
as were considered by a sample of almost 100 state judges.' This common-
ality will make it possible to assess whether jurors or judges are better able
to deal with the types of risk judgments that arise in tort liability contexts.
The participants in the jury sample consisted of 493 jury-eligible adults
who were recruited by a Phoenix survey firm.' Respondents took the sur-
vey, which lasted approximately 30 minutes, and were compensated for
their participation. The survey text appears in the Appendix. As is indicated
in Table Al, the sample included a diverse adult population. The sample
averaged 45 years of age and at least some college education. Females were
overrepresented, but seat belt use and smoking rates were comparable to
national estimates. The comparison set of judges consisted of 91 state
judges who participated in the University of Kansas Law and Economics
Program. These respondents completed the survey before participating in
the program.6
Both jurors and judges are individuals and as a consequence are subject
to many biases and kinds of irrationality identified in human behavior.
Judges differ in a variety of respects, however. They tend to be better edu-
cated than the typical juror. Moreover, because of their judicial experience
they have observed a wide variety of accident cases, have witnessed the
' See W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think about Risk? 1 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 26
(1999).
Sample size may be a few subjects less for some questions owing to nonresponses.
6 See Viscusi, supra note 4, for a survey description.
HeinOnline  -- 30 J. Legal Stud. 109 2001
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
arguments presented by both plaintiffs and defendants, have seen how these
cases have been resolved, and have also seen which case verdicts were
overturned and which were not. Judges typically have also engaged in a
legal practice before becoming judges, which may have expanded their in-
formational base. To the extent that some of the questions require that re-
spondents be able to interpret various legal doctrines in a meaningful way,
one would expect that the previous training of judges would make them
better able to answer such questions correctly.
My effort to compare the relative performance of judges and jurors is
not simply of academic interest. There has been increasing prominence of
proposals to delegate more authority to judges in accident contexts, particu-
larly with respect to setting punitive damages awards.7 For such a shift in
responsibility to be warranted requires that jurors are not always discharg-
ing their responsibilities in the desired manner. These deficiencies are well
documented. However, to shift responsibility also implies that judges could
execute these tasks more in line with sound legal principles. Evidence on
such comparisons is much more limited. One cannot assume that judges
will necessarily be superior assessors of tort contexts if the failings are due
to cognitive biases rather than lack of knowledge of legal doctrine.
The juror's task is to assess liability and damages. Section II examines
whether people think in terms of the types of risk-cost balancing implicit in
negligence rules. In some instances, corporate defendants have undertaken
explicit risk analyses, concluded that the benefits of safety improvements
were outweighed by the costs, and then been the subject of litigation after
an accident. Section III examines how jurors react to such systematic com-
parisons of benefits and costs. Instead of crediting companies for undertak-
ing systematic risk analyses, people are more likely to penalize them for
the deliberate nature of these risk trade-offs. Assessments of damages are
also problematic, as the results in Section IV indicate. Comparison of many
of these results for a sample of judges with the jury-eligible sample indi-
cates fewer biases by judges in their treatment of risk. Moreover, the supe-
rior performance by judges with respect to accident cases is reflective of
their greater ability to think systematically about risk, as is shown by the
results in Section V. Possible remedies are the subject of Section VI.
The substantive themes of the article address different aspects of how
jury-eligible citizens evaluate accident cases. First, do they think in terms
7 See Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, supra note 2, for a proposal that judges be given
increased authority in setting punitive damages levels based on their findings regarding the
substantial error in juror judgments. See also Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, supra note
2, for additional empirical support of the irrationality of juror actions with respect to the
setting of punitive damages awards.
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of trade-offs in a meaningful way? Or are they subject to a zero-risk mental-
ity that not only does not permit sensible trade-offs but also holds firms up
to an unattainable standard of safety at any cost? This aspect of juror atti-
tudes was captured in the negligence analysis in Section II, the attitude of
jurors toward corporate risk analysis in Section III, and the evidence of in-
finite risk-money trade-offs in Section V. Second, do jurors have accurate
risk beliefs? The evidence on risk overestimation and alarmist responses in
the presence of damages lotteries in Section IV indicates that jurors over-
assess low-probability events and are particularly likely to focus on the
worst-case scenario. The net result is that jurors are likely to impose exces-
sive penalties in accident contexts. The results here also embody a variety
of other overreactions to accident cases that have been identified in the liter-
ature, including outrage effects and anchoring biases.
II. APPLICATION OF NEGLIGENCE RULES
How well do people fare when given the task of judging if a corporation
has been negligent? This section will explore how well jury-eligible citizens
can follow the Learned Hand rule in making negligence judgments.8 In par-
ticular, will they make decisions as would efficiency-oriented economists
to adopt safety measures provided that the benefits exceed the costs? Sec-
tion III will address the same economic principle when the risk analysis is
performed by the company.
In the particular test used, respondents considered a scenario involving
an airplane repair situation. Each person considered only one scenario, but
a total of four different scenarios were tested across different subsamples.
There is some cost of repair and associated expected benefits from the re-
pair for each scenario. The cost of the repair remains unchanged across the
scenarios, as do the expected benefits. However, the scale of the losses in-
creases and the probability of an accident diminishes to keep the expected
benefits of making the repair constant. Do juror judgments incorporate such
changes that leave expected benefits unchanged? The parameters of the
problem are such that the $2,000 cost of the repair always exceeds the
$1,500 value of the expected benefits so that the repair decision never
passes a benefit-cost test. Thus, the firm should not be found negligent,
much less be punished with a punitive damages award.
Large-loss, low-probability events create potential problems for decision
See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (3d ed. 1986), and A. Mitchell Polin-
sky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (2d ed. 1989), for a review of these doctrines
and their linkage to the original Learned Hand formula. These principles are elaborated for
the risk context in W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages against Corpora-
tions in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 Geo. L. J. 285 (1998).
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making. The intent of these manipulations is to see if increasing the size of
the stakes dominates jurors' thinking even when the probability of an acci-
dent diminishes proportionately. If jurors are not sensitive to the propor-
tional drop in the probability that occurs for the scenarios in which the size
of the stakes increases, then that will suggest that firms operating in con-
texts in which the stakes are great will be severely disadvantaged. Even if
companies' safety behavior has resulted in a very low probability of an ac-
cident, jurors may focus on the magnitude of the stakes involved rather than
the expected damages, that is, the probability of damage multiplied by the
size of the loss.
The jurors considered one of five different scenarios, where their first
task was to determine if they would have ordered a repair, had it been their
decision. The decision to repair the plane is not, however, identical to find-
ing that the firm was liable on account of negligence. Respondents might
favor making a repair but not hold the firm liable. This question was in-
tended to engage respondents in the repair task and to get them thinking
about how they would make the cost-risk trade-offs. Each scenario was a
variant of the initial scenario given below:
You are CEO of Rocky Mountain Airlines. The cargo door on a plane does not
operate properly. Fixing it costs $2,000. If it is not fixed, there is absolutely no
safety risk. Very reliable engineering estimates indicate that there is only a 1/10
chance that there will be a total loss to your company of $15,000 due to materials
damage to cargo over the life of the plane. Thus, there is a 90 percent chance that
there will be no damage whatsoever. Your company has no insurance but will be
liable for the cost of this damage.
Respondents were then asked if they should repair the plane and, if the
plane is not repaired and there is damage, if there should be punitive dam-
ages. The other scenarios raised the losses to $1.5 million, $150 million (29
deaths valued at $5 million, which reflects the full social value of life), and
$1.5 billion (290 deaths valued at $5 million each) and decreased the proba-
bilities of an accident to 1/1,000 (for $1.5 million in damages), 1/100,000
(for $150 million in damages), and 1/1,000,000 (for $1.5 billion in dam-
ages).
Most respondents favored repairing the plane in all instances shown in
Table 1. The percentages of the mock juror sample favoring repairs are 87-
88 percent in the two property damage scenarios and 93-96 percent in the
two fatality scenarios.
After considering the repair decision, the respondents were then told that
the company chose not to repair the plane and the projected damage did in
fact occur. The jurors were then asked if punitive damages would apply in
HeinOnline  -- 30 J. Legal Stud. 112 2001
TABLE 1
RELATION OF JURORS' OPINONS ON REPAIRING AIRPLANE DEFECT TO WHETHER
PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD APPLY IF AN ACCIDENT OCCURS
JURORS' OPINIONS
Do Not
Repair Plane Repair Plane Total
A. Property damage low ($15,000),
risk probability 1/10:
Punitive apply 75 (65.2) 10 (8.6) 85 (73.9)
Punitives do not apply 26 (22.6) 4 (3.5) 30 (26.1)
Total 101 (87.8) 14 (12.2) 115 (100)
B. Property damage high ($1.5
million), risk probability
1/1,000:
Punitives apply 105 (73.4) 7 (4.0) 112 (78.3)
Punitives do not apply 19 (13.3) 12 (8.4) 31 (21.7)
Total 124 (86.7) 19 (13.3) 143 (100)
C. Personal injury = 29 deaths for
$150 million, risk probability
1/100,000:
Punitives apply 110 (92.4) 4 (3.4) 114 (95.8)
Punitives do not apply 4 (3.4) 1 (.8) 5 (4.2)
Total 114 (95.8) 5 (4.2) 119 (100)
D. Personal injury = 290 deaths for
$1.5 billion, risk probability
1 / 1,000,000:
Punitives apply 50 (89.3) 3 (5.4) 53 (94.6)
Punitives do not apply 2 (3.6) 1 (1.8) 3 (5.3)
Total 52 (92.9) 4 (8.9) 56 (100)
Overall results:
Punitives apply 340 (78.5) 24 (5.5) 364 (84.1)
Punitives do not apply 51 (11.8) 18 (4.2) 69 (15.9)




A versus B .340 .955
C versus D .936 .354
(A + B) versus (C + D) 2.782** 5.569**
NOTE.-Values in the top panel are presented as N (%). Percentages might not sum across rows and
column due to rounding error.
** Significant at the 99% confidence level (two-tailed test).
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this instance. The percentage of respondents awarding punitive damages
was 74-78 percent for the two property damage scenarios and 95-96 per-
cent for the two personal injury scenarios for which total damages are
greater. In every case an extremely large percentage of jurors awarded puni-
tive damages. This result is particularly striking since the firm is not even
negligent, much less guilty of reckless conduct warranting a punitive award.
The punitive damages awards become more frequent as the stakes rise, as
the significance tests reported at the bottom of Table 1 indicate.
These tests are for the within-juror sample by looking across the different
scenarios. However, it is also possible to examine the performance for any
given scenario across the judge and juror samples. Doing so provides addi-
tional evidence regarding the extent of jurors' errors in reflecting risk-cost
trade-offs in their thinking.
A sample of state judges considered three of the four scenarios listed in
Table 1 but reacted quite differently. Whereas 88 percent of the jurors fa-
vored airplane repair for case A, only 32 percent of the judges did. Simi-
larly, 74 percent of the jurors favored punitive damages in that case, as
compared with only 18 percent of the judges. The 74 percent-18 percent
disparity between jurors and judges in the decision to award punitive dam-
ages provides striking evidence that judges exercise more restraint in
awarding punitive damages. This result is consistent with the frequent over-
turning or reduction of punitive damages by judges, especially upon appeal.
In this low-stakes case, most judges acted in accordance with economic
efficiency norms in making their decision and in choosing whether to pun-
ish a company whose decision turned out badly, whereas most of the jury-
eligible sample failed to do so.
As the size of the loss increases to $1.5 million in case B of Table 1, the
differences narrow but are still considerable. The repair percentages are 87
percent for the jurors and 48 percent for the judges, while the punitive dam-
ages percentages are 78 percent for the jurors and 28 percent for the judges.
In the case D situation of personal injury, all the judges would repair the
plane, which is comparable to the 96 percent figure for jurors.9 Whereas 69
percent of the judges would award punitive damages, 96 percent of the ju-
rors would do so. Extreme losses involving personal injury narrow the gap
between judges and jurors, but jurors remain much more willing to levy
punitive damages.
Both groups display an increased willingness to repair the plane and to
impose punitive damages as the stakes rise, especially when loss of human
9 Judges did not consider the case C scenaio.
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life is involved. However, judges are much more willing than jurors to
forgo the repair of the plane and to refrain from imposing punitive dam-
ages.
Neither set of respondents was told the judgment rule to apply or that
expected benefits were below costs of the repair. Thus, they were not given
an explicit indication that a negligence test would not be appropriate. How-
ever, judges showed a greater capacity than the juror sample to undertake
such risk balancing as part of their own assessment of the safety situation.
III. CORPORATE RISK ANALYSES AND JUROR JUDGMENTS
A. Risk Analysis Scenarios
Whereas the airplane scenario asked the respondents to, in effect, make
a decision based on their own benefit-cost judgments, in many litigation
contexts it is often the corporation that has made these judgments on the
basis of an explicit benefit-cost analysis. When the company proceeds with
a risky action after concluding that the safety benefits are outweighed by
the costs, and if this decision turns out badly, will jurors punish the corpora-
tion with punitive damages? Thus, does the fact that a company has per-
formed an explicit economic analysis convey a sense of willful and reckless
disregard that harms its prospects in court?
Contexts in which there is a corporate risk analysis and a decision to
forgo a safety measure followed by an accident are situations in which
hindsight bias effects come into play. Not only does the jury believe that
the accident could have been anticipated, but the company even did an anal-
ysis in which it explicitly considered such a prospect but chose not to take
preventive measures.
Although the role of hindsight can take on many forms, the effect of
hindsight when there is the risk of an accident most often has the following
character. Suppose that before the accident, the best available knowledge
suggests that there is some low probability p that an accident might occur
owing to some risky activity by the firm. In fact, the accident does occur.
In retrospect, people may claim now that the accident has occurred that the
firm should have anticipated that it would have occurred. Rather than attri-
bute a probability p to the accident, in hindsight people think the chance of
an accident was greater than p on the basis of information available before
the accident. In the extreme case they may claim that it is obvious that the
accident would definitely have occurred with probability 1.0, whereas in ad-
vance the anticipated risk was really quite small.
Hindsight effects are among the most well-documented biases with re-
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spect to juror behavior.'" Many of the most consequential inventions and
innovative economic theories may appear to be sufficiently obvious in ret-
rospect that one wonders why they had not been developed earlier. Simi-
larly, second-guessing managerial decisions is a popular pastime of sports
fans. While such retrospective ruminations usually have no major adverse
consequences, hindsight biases with respect to juror deliberations can have
a distorting and deleterious influence. Assessments involving corporate risk
analysis are not pure tests of hindsight effects, as they incorporate other
influences as well. However, in all of these instances there is at least some
element of hindsight in that juror deliberations after the fact have a quite
different character than corporate decisions that must be made before the
risk lottery is resolved.
To promote reasonable risks, corporations should think carefully about
the risk levels, opportunities for reducing the risk, and the associated
costs." As Judge Frank Easterbrook has observed, corporations are typi-
cally better situated than jurors to make such judgments because of their
specialized technical knowledge regarding the sources of risk and the cost
functions for various risk-reducing actions. However, their superior ex ante
risk judgments may be outweighed by the ex post reality of the accident
victim:
The ex post perspective of litigation exerts a hydraulic force that distorts judgment.
Engineers design escalators to minimize the sum of construction, operation, and
injury costs. Department stores, which have nothing to gain from maiming their
customers and employees, willingly pay for cost-effective precautions .... Come
the lawsuit, however, the passenger injured by a stop presents himself as a person,
not a probability. Jurors see today's injury; persons who would be injured if buttons
were harder to find and use are invisible. Although witnesses may talk about them,
they are spectral figures, insubstantial compared to the injured plaintiff, who ap-
pears in the flesh. 2
Indeed, appropriate risk balancing lies at the heart of tort liability concepts
such as the negligence doctrine, the Learned Hand formula, and risk-utility
" A considerable literature is concerned with hindsight effects in legal contexts. See,
among others, Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, Juror Judgments in Civil Cases, supra note 2; Reid
Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk
Manager, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 901 (1998); Mark Kelman, David Elliot, & Hilary Folger, Decom-
posing Hindsight Bias, 16 J. Risk & Uncertainty 251 (1998); and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571 (1998).
" A less formal overview of these results and broader discussion of the legal context ap-
pears in W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act? 52 Stan. L. Rev. 547
(2000).
2 See his superb discussion in Carrol v. Otis Elevator, 896 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Easterbrook, F., concurring).
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analysis. Rather than have corporations make such decisions randomly or
without any factual basis, the courts should foster careful consideration of
risks and costs to promote both greater safety overall and more cost-
effective achievement of safety levels. Society can then use its resources
most effectively to enhance safety in the areas where these expenditures are
most effective.
Unfortunately, our legal system is replete with examples of companies
being punished in situations in which they have undertaken responsible risk
analyses. The legendary Ford Pinto case, in which Ford apparently traded
off risk and costs in its analysis of a prospective government safety regula-
tion, led to Ford's being pilloried for insensitivity to the risk-cost trade-offs
associated with the dangers of rear-impact crashes for the Ford Pinto. 3 In
a case involving a defective door latch for a Chrysler minivan, Chrysler was
attacked for its cost-risk analysis. In the view of the plaintiff's attorneys,
"Chrysler officials at the highest level cold bloodedly calculated that ac-
knowledging the problem and fixing it would be more expensive, in terms
of bad publicity and lost sales, than concealing the defect and litigating the
wrongful death suits that inevitably would result." 14 Ford came under simi-
lar attack for an analysis of the Ford Mustang that paralleled that in the
Ford Pinto case. Ford's transgression involved what the court labeled
'safety science management." "S
General Motors (GM) similarly has been punished by juries for analyzing
the cost per vehicle of preventing fuel-fed fires. 6 Indeed, the existence of
an internal GM memo on fuel tank fires was a key factor that led to a $4.9
billion verdict against GM in July 1999 for bum injuries to six passengers
in a Chevrolet Malibu, where the award consisted of $100 million in com-
pensatory damages and $4.8 billion in punitive damages. 7 The internal
memo that was the focal point of this case closely parallels the analysis in
scenario 3 discussed below except that the compensatory award levels have
been updated to reflect the change in award levels over the quarter-century
since the memo was written.
"3 For a detailed discussion of the Ford Pinto experience, as well as a debunking of many
popular misconceptions about the character of this analysis on the part of Ford, see Gary
Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. 1013 (1991); and Brent
Fisse & John Braitwaite, The Impact of Publicity on Corporate Offenders (1983).
" See Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp., No. 2-96-269-11 (D.S.C. October 8, 1997); and Donald
C. Dillworth, Fourteen Jurors Punish Chrysler for Hiding Deadly Defect, 34 Trial 14 (Febru-
ary 1998).
11 See Ford Motor Company v. Stubblefield et al., 171 Ga. App. 331, 319 S.E.2d 470
(1984).
16 In particular, see Moseley v. General Motors Corp., 213 Ga. App. 875 (1994).
"7 See Andrew Pollack, Paper Trail Haunts G.M. after It Loses Injury Suit: An Old Memo
Hinted at the Price of Safety, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1999, at A12.
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The fact that the company traded off human health risks against profits
played a critical role in the GM trial. As the plaintiff's attorney Brian J.
Parish summarized the jury's zero-risk mentality, "The jurors wanted to
send a message to General Motors that human life is more important than
profits." 8 One juror specifically cited the use of concrete value-of-life esti-
mates as a concern: "We're just like numbers, I feel, to them ... statistics.
That's something that is wrong." 9
These examples are not unique but are reflective of the kinds of situations
in which corporate risk analyses have in fact had an adverse effect on the
company's prospects in court. In such cases jurors may have considered the
company reckless simply because the company did an analysis, not because
the analysis was flawed or deficient in any way.
Juror reactions to corporate analysis may embody more than one set of
influences. In hindsight the cause of the accident may be more apparent. If
a corporation undertook a detailed risk analysis before the accident, this ef-
fort may be taken as a signal of the foreseeability of the accidental outcome.
Failing to undertake a safety improvement after a detailed risk analysis may
be treated as indicating a conscious disregard for safety even if the analysis
itself was correct and indicated that safety improvements were not war-
ranted. Another class of influences is that a benefit-cost analysis shows a
willingness to trade off risks against cost. Jurors who have a zero-risk men-
tality may view trade-offs of any kind to be unconscionable. Even striking
a balance that goes beyond that reflected in governmental regulatory policy
may offend jurors' sensibilities.
To isolate the effect of undertaking a corporate risk analysis, each mock
juror considered one of five different scenarios summarized in Table 2.
Each scenario is a variant on scenario 1, the case described below:
A major auto company with annual profits of $7 billion made a line of cars with a
defective electrical system. This failure led to a series of fires in these vehicles that
caused 4 bum deaths per year. Changing the design to prevent these deaths would
cost $16 million for the 40,000 vehicles affected per year. This safety design change
would raise the price of cars $400 each. The company thought there might be some
risk from the current design, but did not believe it would be significant. The com-
pany notes that even with these injuries, the vehicle had one of the best safety rec-
ords in its class.
The courts have awarded each of the victims' families $800,000 in damages to
compensate them for the income loss and pain and suffering that resulted. After
these lawsuits, the company altered future designs to eliminate the problem.
"S See Andrew Pollack, $4.9 Billion Jury Verdict in G.M. Fuel Tank Case: Penalty High-
lights Cracks in Legal System, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1999, at A7.
19 Id.
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TABLE 2
JUROR RISK SURVEY VARIATIONS
Scenario Description
No benefit-cost analysis:
1 No analysis performed, $4 million cost per life
saved
2 No analysis performed, $1 million cost per life
saved
Benefit-cost analysis performed:
3 Analysis using $800,000 compensatory damages
amount to value life, $4 million cost per life
saved
4 Analysis using NHTSA value-of-life figure of $3 mil-
lion, $4 million cost per life saved
5 Erroneous analysis using NHTSA value-of-life figure
of $3 million, estimated cost per life saved of $4
million but actual amount was $2 million
NOTE.-NHTSA = National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. In the first survey, 10 lives were
lost; in the second survey, four lives were lost.
Respondents then had to indicate whether the court should also award
punitive damages and, if so, how much. By comparing the responses across
different scenarios, one can ascertain the incremental effect of different ex-
perimental manipulations. Thus, the accident context remains the same, but
there are differences across the five scenarios in the nature of the economic
analysis. Moreover, each of these scenarios was tested with two different
levels of injuries.
B. Performance of Different Scenarios
As the results in Table 3 indicate, for scenario 1 about 85 percent of the
sample would award punitive damages, with a median value of $1 million
and a geometric mean value of $3 million. The high propensity to award
punitive damages proved to be the case even with major variations in the
number of deaths per year (four versus 10). Because the manipulation in-
volving the number of total deaths had no significant effect, the results in
Table 3 pool these findings. These high levels of punitive awards are not
an experimental aberration but appear to track how strongly jurors reacted
to such auto injury cases. Thus, the evidence of some ceiling effects with
respect to the frequency of punitive awards may reflect the strong reactions
juries in practice have had to auto design defect cases. The main variation
across scenarios will consequently be in the assessed damages level.
Scenario 2 lowers the cost of making the car safer but is otherwise identi-
cal to scenario 1, as the firm does not undertake any systematic risk analy-
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TABLE 3





Version of Survey N Damages ($Millions) Award
No benefit-cost analysis by company:
$4 million per life (scenario 1) 97 .845 2.95 1.0
$1 million per life (scenario 2) 97 .918 2.86 1.0
Combined no analysis by company 194 .881 2.91 1.0
Benefit-cost analysis by company:
Court costs as value (scenario 3) 97 .928 4.02 3.5
NHTSA value of life (scenario 4) 102 .931 5.31 10.0
NHTSA value of life, error (scenario 5) 96 .948 4.50 10.0
Combined analysis by company 295 .936 4.59 10.0
Total for all five scenarios 489 .914 3.85 5.0
NOTE.-NHTSA = National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. For punitive damages frequency,
t = 2.0958 (significant at the 95% confidence level); for In(punitive damages amount), t = 2.4431 (sig-
nificant at the 95% confidence level).
sis. Instead of costing $4 million per life saved, the cost drops to $1 million,
or safety improvements are more desirable in benefit-cost terms. As is indi-
cated by the summary of results in Table 3, for scenario 2 the frequency of
awarding punitive damages rises by 0.07, the geometric mean award drops
by $0.1 million, and the median award remains at $1 million. However,
none of these differences from scenario 1 are statistically significant.2" Ju-
rors are not sensitive to these different costs of providing safety.
Scenario 3 introduces the role of corporate risk analysis in which the
company estimated that these deaths might occur and valued them at a com-
pensatory damages amount of $800,000 each. Compared with scenario 1,
which has the same cost per life saved but no risk analysis, the frequency
of punitive damages awards rises by 0.08, the geometric mean award rises
by $1.07 million, and the median award increases by $2.5 million.2
Juries might, however, be reluctant to endorse such analyses to the extent
that compensatory awards undervalue the saving of human life. Suppose
instead that the company did not use the compensatory damages amount
but rather used a willingness-to-pay value-of-life measure. Specifically, the
survey informed the respondent that the company used a $3 million value
20 The pertinent t-statistics for these different tests are 1.58 for the probability and 0.100
for the amount of the award.
2' The pertinent t-values are 1.826 for the probability (significant at the 95 percent confi-
dence level, one-tailed test) and 1.058 for the mean amount of the log of the award.
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of life in its analysis and followed the approach now used by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in determining if a motor
vehicle safety regulation is worthwhile. Comparison of scenarios 3 and 4
makes it possible to ascertain the incremental effect of using such a higher
value of life instead of a compensatory damages amount. The probability
of awarding punitive damages remains at 0.93, but the geometric mean
award level jumps by $5.31 million, and the median award jumps by $6.5
million.22 It is especially noteworthy that the $3 million value-of-life figure
used in the scenario 4 analysis serves as an anchor that boosts punitive
damages. Whereas 42 percent of the sample recommending punitive dam-
ages indicated an award level of $1 million or less for scenario 3, with sce-
nario 4 this percentage drops to 35 percent.
More responsible risk analyses have an adverse effect on the company's
prospects, as jurors apparently seek to top the company's internal valuation.
These higher award amounts do not appear to be the result of greater jury
outrage-an effect found to be very influential in other contexts.23 Presum-
ably, jurors should be more receptive to a company's acting in line with the
same risk evaluation guidelines as those used by government agencies. The
effect instead appears to be due to anchoring.24 Jurors wishing to "send a
message" to the company have to levy punitive damages that are higher so
as to top the corporation's value-of-life figure and foster a higher degree of
safety than would emerge from the firm's estimates.
In scenario 5 the company's risk analysis is the same as in scenario 4
except that the company errs in its analysis by underassessing the level of
the risk by 50 percent. How do flaws in the risk estimate that would affect
the outcome of a benefit-cost analysis influence juror behavior? The result
is that the cost per life saved turns out to be $2 million rather than the $4
million value estimated by the company. On the basis of the actual costs
and risks, the benefits of improved safety would have exceeded the costs.
These errors have an inconsequential effect on the propensity to award pu-
nitive damages or the level of such awards.
By pooling the similar scenarios, these effects are more pronounced as
well as statistically significant. For scenarios 1 and 2, in which there is no
analysis by the company, an average of 88 percent of the respondents
would favor punitive damages, as compared with 94 percent for the other
22 The pertinent t-values are 0.088 for the probability of an award and 1.066 for the mean
values of the log of the award.
23 See Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, supra note 2.
24 Anchoring effects arise in other punitive damages contexts as well. See Hastie,
Schkade, & Payne, Juror Judgments in Civil Cases, supra note 2.
25 Pertinent t-values are 0.50 for the probability and 0.60 for the log of the award.
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TABLE 4
EFFECT OF CASE CHARACTERISTICS ON THE PROBABILITY
OF A PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD: MARGINAL
PROBABILITIES BASED ON PROBIT ESTIMATES
(1) (2)
Risk analysis performed .051* .051*
(.027) (.027)
Cost per life saved -. 011 -. 011
(.089) (.009)
High absolute risk -. 021 -. 027
(.028) (.030)
Personal characteristics included No Yes
NOTE.-Values shown are coefficient (standard error). Personal
characteristics included an indicator variable for sex, education in
years, age, personal revealed value-of-life estimate, an indicator for
infinite value of life, and two measures of mortality risk belief.
* Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level (one-tailed
test).
three scenarios. This 6 percent difference is statistically significant (t =
2.10). Differences in the award level are also statistically significant (t =
2.44 for the mean of the log award), with the geometric mean rising from
$2.9 million for the no-analysis scenarios to $4.6 million for those with risk
analysis, while the median award increases from $1 million to $10 million.
Each of the five scenarios was run in two variants-one set the number
of lives lost at four and the other set it equal to 10. This manipulation
sought to test whether the absolute level of risk was a matter of concern.
Surprisingly, the influence of this difference was never significant.26
These variations in response across scenarios are not attributable to the
role of respondents' personal characteristics. Table 4 provides the probit es-
timates for the probability that the respondent favors a punitive damages
award, where the coefficients have been transformed to reflect the marginal
probability effect of each variable. Table 5 presents analogous regression
estimates for the natural logarithm of award size. The principal experimen-
tal manipulations included in the initial set of estimates were whether the
company performed a risk analysis, the cost per life saved, and whether the
absolute risk level was high (that is, 10 deaths rather than four deaths). The
second set of estimates in each case adds a detailed series of personal char-
acteristics: gender, age, race, education, smoking status, and seat belt use.
These variables have a small effect on the coefficient estimates, as the pure
experimental effects are largely unaffected. Moreover, the predictive power
26 Pertinent t-values are 0.80 for the probability and 0.43 for the log of the award.
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TABLE 5
EFFECT OF CASE CHARACTERISTICS ON THE SIZE
OF A PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD: NATURAL
LOGARITHM OF AWARD SIZE
(1) (2)
Risk analysis performed .466* .378**
(.188) (.190)
Cost per life saved .055 .033
(.067) (.069)
High absolute risk -. 132 -. 124
(.199) (.203)
Personal characteristics included No Yes
R2  .02 .04
NOTE.-Values shown are coefficient (standard error). Personal
characteristics included an indicator variable for sex, education in
years, age, personal revealed value-of-life estimate, an indicator for
infinite value of life, and two measures of mortality risk beliefs.
* Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level (one-tailed
test).
** Statistically significant at the 99% confidence level (one-tailed
test).
of the equations is very low. Somewhat surprisingly, controlling demo-
graphic factors has a negligible effect on the influence of risk analyses on
punitive damages. The statistically significant manipulation in these esti-
mates is whether the company performed a risk analysis. Undertaking a risk
analysis increases the probability of a punitive damages award by 0.052" in
both equations. Moreover, the risk analysis variable boosts the level of a
punitive damages award by 47 percent and 38 percent for the two sets of
estimates in Table 5.
The absence of other statistically significant risk variable influences in
Tables 4 and 5 is noteworthy as well. Ideally, it should be efficiency con-
cerns that drive juror judgments, in particular the shortfall of the company's
behavior from the socially efficient risk trade-off level. However, the cost
per life saved, which is the pivotal efficiency index, is not statistically sig-
nificant. In addition, even the absolute level of the risk proves to be incon-
sequential. The fact that the variables that should affect juror judgments
have no significant effect is a striking result in that it indicates that the un-
derlying economic merits are not consequential. All that matters is whether
the company performed a risk analysis in advance.
27 Note that the reported probit coefficients have been transformed to reflect the marginal
probabilities of each variable.
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TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF JURORS FAVORING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES, BY SYNTHETIC JURY
NUMBER OF JURORS
SURVEY VERSION 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1: No analysis, $4 million per life .1 .1 1.9 6.7 18.2 32.0 28.2 12.8
2: No analysis, $1 million per life 0 0 0 .9 4.1 19.4 40.2 35.4
1 and 2: Combined no analysis .05 .05 1.0 3.8 11.2 25.7 34.2 24.1
3: Analysis, court costs 0 0 0 .5 3.3 16.0 41.2 39.0
4: Analysis, NHTSA value 0 0 0 .2 2.8 16.1 40.7 40.2
5: Flawed analysis, NHTSA value 0 0 0 0 1.3 11.2 39.9 47.6
3-5: Combined analysis 0 0 0 .2 2.5 14.4 40.6 42.3
NOTE.-NHTSA = National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
C. Synthetic Juries
The results for the corporate risk analysis scenarios thus far have focused
on individual responses and the determinants of these results. A somewhat
different question is how juries would actually perform in such cases. In-
stead of focusing on an individual, the issue becomes one of group decision
making. The approach here will consider a series of synthetic juries drawn
randomly from the 489 respondents on a scenario-by-scenario basis. These
synthetic jury results will give some indication of how the decision to
award punitive damages and the determination of the level of punitive dam-
ages would have fared in a jury context. However, as the comparison of
synthetic jury results28 with actual group decision making29 indicates, group
decision making in practice may lead to more extreme awards rather than
a moderation of outcomes.3"
The procedure used to construct the synthetic juries is the following. For
each of the five versions of the survey a random sampling replacement pro-
cedure was used to draw 1,000 juries of 12 individuals. For these 1,000
mock juries, it is possible to analyze the distribution of the number of jurors
who favor the award of punitive damages as well as the level of punitive
damages that they favor.
Consider first the distribution of the number of jurors favoring punitive
damages, which is shown in Table 6. For scenario 1, in which the company
28 See Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, supra note 2.
29 See Schkade, Sunstein, & Kahneman, supra note 2.
30 Indeed, this phenomenon may be more general, as is indicated by ongoing research by
Cass Sunstein.
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undertook no analysis but there was a cost per life saved of $4 million,
there were very few cases in which the jurors were unanimous in favoring
a punitive damages award. In only 12.8 percent of the cases did all 12 jurors
favor a punitive damages award, and in only 28.2 percent of the cases did
11 of the jurors favor punitive damages. If, however, the cost per life saved
drops to $1 million, as in scenario 2, the jurors become much more willing
to levy punitive damages. Jurors unanimously recommend punitive dam-
ages 35.4 percent of the time, and all but one juror favor punitive damages
40.2 percent of the time. The overall combined results of the 2,000 syn-
thetic juries for scenarios 1 and 2 appear in the third row of Table 6. For
these two scenarios, 24.1 percent of the juries unanimously favored punitive
damages, and an additional 34.2 percent had all but one juror in favor of
punitive damages.
The lower half of Table 6 gives the results for the three analysis scenar-
ios, each of which indicates a striking willingness of jurors to levy punitive
damages. The instances in which all jurors unanimously favor punitive
damages range from 39.0 percent for scenario 3 to 47.6 percent in scenario
5. The instances in which all but one juror favor punitive damages averaged
approximately 40.0 percent in all three scenarios. The result is that the com-
bined analysis of the 3,000 synthetic juries in scenarios 3-5 indicates that
42.3 percent of the synthetic juries unanimously favored punitive damages,
with an additional 40.6 percent having all but one juror in favor of punitive
damages. Overall, 82.9 percent of the synthetic juries had 11 or 12 jurors
favoring punitive damages in the three scenarios in which the company did
analysis, compared with 58.3 percent of the juries for the two situations in
which the company did not do analysis.
These results in the frequency of awarding punitive damages for the syn-
thetic juries consequently magnify the differences that were found in indi-
vidual responses. Consideration of the frequency with which jurors awarded
punitive damages on an individual basis did not yield results for the proba-
bility of awarding punitive damages as striking as it did for the level of
punitive damages. However, once these individuals are placed in a group
context, the role of these differences becomes very apparent. The greater
willingness of jurors to levy punitive damages when the company performs
a risk analysis dramatically shifts the balance in a jury to a level that is
much more nearly unanimous or almost unanimously in favor of punitive
damages.
The second issue pertaining to the role of synthetic juries is the level of
punitive damages that they would award. Table 7 reports the award level
favored by the median juror, the mean value of the award favored by these
jurors, and the standard error of the mean. The review of the literature sug-
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TABLE 7
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDED BY SYNTHETIC JUDGES
Median Mean
Survey Version ($Millions) ($Millions) SE
1: No analysis, $4 million per life 1 2.5 .1
2: No analysis, $1 million per life 1 3.5 .1
1 and 2: Combined no analysis 1 3.0 .1
3: Analysis, court costs 3 4.5 .1
4: Analysis, NHTSA value 7.5 6.9 .1
5: Flawed analysis, NHTSA value 6 6.0 .1
3-5: Combined analysis 6 5.8 .1
NOTE.-SE = standard error; NHTSA = National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration.
gests that the median award is the most representative statistic for reflecting
actual jury behavior though, as is indicated above, it may understate the
extent to which groups will levy harsh punitive damages sanctions.31
The synthetic jury results for the award levels in Table 7 reflect the pat-
terns found earlier for the individual responses as well as the kinds of dis-
crepancies reflected in the synthetic jury results for the probability of
awarding punitive damages. Although there is little variation in the median
award level for the no-analysis scenarios, the mean level of the award is
higher for the no-analysis scenario 2, which mirrors the greater propensity
to award punitive damages in that instance as well. For the combined re-
sults for scenarios 1 and 2, the median award level is $1 million and the
mean award level is $3 million.
The three analysis scenarios indicate higher award levels than in the no-
analysis situations. The highest awards occur not when the company uses
a low value of life based on court awards in scenario 3, nor in scenario 5,
in which the company undertakes erroneous analysis. Rather, it is for sce-
nario 4, in which the company performs the analysis correctly and in line
with the procedures used by the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration, that the jury levies its greatest sanction-$7.5 million for a median
award and $6.9 million for the mean award level. The combined results for
the three analysis scenarios indicated a median award level of $6 million
and a mean award level of $5.8 million, each of which is substantially
above the comparable findings for the no-analysis scenarios.
What these synthetic jury results suggest is that the individual differences
in the propensity to award punitive damages and the setting of the level of
punitive damages may translate into considerable differences in terms of
31 See Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, supra note 2.
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actual group decision-making outcomes. Moreover, as in the individual re-
sults, the results are the opposite of what one would hope to find. Per-
forming a risk analysis is likely to tilt the jurors against the company in a
manner that can have a demonstrable and substantial effect on jury out-
comes.
The failure to find many systematic predictors of the level of punitive
damages awards in Table 5 as is evidenced by the low explanatory power
and the insignificant risk variables is reflective of more general difficulties
jurors have in mapping their concerns into dollars. Jurors have no consistent
basis for mapping their outrage into dollar awards.32 The finding that only
the existence of a corporate risk analysis rather than other aspects of the
risk context is influential in driving the award of punitive damages or their
level is consistent with the spirit of findings in which no clear liability prin-
ciples appear to be driving juror behavior. In the case of risk analyses that
specify value-of-life figures, both outrage and anchoring effects are influ-
ential.
IV. SETTING DAMAGES WHEN LoSSES MAY VARY
Tort liability situations involve many uncertainties. It is rare that we
know in advance that an accident will occur. Moreover, if an accident does
occur, the amount of the damage may vary. Dealing with the role of possi-
ble loss variance creates potential hurdles for juror judgments. If jurors
have ambiguity aversion and anchor their views on the worst-possible-case
scenario rather than the actual damages amount, the damages levied will be
too high. The results below will also compare juror behavior with that of
judges, who will be found to have less of a bias of this type.
Suppose that an accident could generate damages that could have either
a high value or a low value. Thus, there will be damages, but there is a
lottery on the damages level. What should be the accident award? The legal
principles in situations of financial loss are well established. Compensating
the accident victim for the amount of the loss provides an optimal level of
insurance of the harm. Damages equal to the size of the loss will also create
efficient levels of deterrence if we assume away complications such as de-
tectability problems. Thus, paying off damages equal to the high-loss
amount when the loss is high and the low-loss amount when the loss is low
will generate efficient insurance and deterrence. While there is no other op-
timal insurance amount, it is possible to create efficient deterrence by al-
ways setting damages equal to the expected loss. However, such a penalty
32 See Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, supra note 2; and Sunstein, Kahneman, &
Schkade, supra note 2.
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will not provide optimal insurance, and for it to provide efficient deterrence,
damages must always be paid when there is a damages lottery even if the
low-damages amount is zero. However, these cases will not appear in court.
If instead damages are always set to equal the worst-case scenario, they will
provide excessive insurance for the low-loss cases and excessive deter-
rence. Thus, I will take damages equal to the loss as the normative refer-
ence point for compensatory damages awards.
To explore the influence of uncertainty regarding the damages amount,
respondents considered an oil well blowout situation in which there was a
lottery on damages. Some respondents received the scenario in which the
lottery outcome was a low level of losses, while others considered a sce-
nario in which the losses were high. The scenario was as follows:
Acme Oil Company has been found that it did not meet the legal standards for safe
operation of its wells. Consequently, it is liable for an oil well blowout that caused
$10 million in property damage and no personal injury. The company in many re-
spects was unfortunate in that such blowouts have a 90% chance of no damage and
a 10% chance of $10 million in damages. What damages award would you select?
The counterpart scenario also had $10 million in damages actually oc-
curring, but the company was fortunate in that the damages could have been
worse-$100 million. Do the respondents focus on what might have been,
or do they assess damages properly on the basis of the actual outcome? Fo-
cusing on what might have been would be a form of ambiguity aversion or
alarmist response to risk that has been identified as an influence in other
risk contexts for probabilities.33 In particular, people often focus on the
worst-case scenario in terms of the level of the risk probability when the
probability is uncertain. Here the uncertainty involves the size of the loss.
Risk aversion should presumably not be influential because there is no indi-
cation that the losses are borne privately and concentrated among a small
group.
Table 8 summarizes the damages amounts levied by a sample of judges
and jury-eligible citizens, where for simplicity the results from both scenar-
ios have been pooled. The results for the judges' sample varied very little
across the two scenarios. Overall, 92 percent of the judges given this ques-
tion selected a $10 million award, which was the value of damages that
occurred. The median award level was also $10 million, and the geometric
mean of the awards was quite similar, as it was $11.1 million.
The results for the jury-eligible citizens reflect an enormous variation in
the assessed damages amount. Even though the actual damages were only
" See Viscusi, Rational Risk Policy, supra note 1, for a review of this evidence.
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TABLE 8
COMPARISON OF JUDGES' AND JURORS' AWARDS
IN OIL WELL BLOWOUT TRIAL
















NOTE.-For judges, the median award was $10 million and the
geometric mean award was $11.14 million. For juries, the median
award was $30 million and the geometric mean award was $21.43
million. In a t-test on arithmetic means, t = 4.7942 (99% confi-
dence level).
$10 million, only 26 percent of the respondents assessed this damages
value. In contrast, virtually the entire judges' sample selected $10 million
in damages. Thirty-seven percent of the juror sample awarded $30 million
in damages. Roughly one-fifth of the sample awarded damages under $10
million, with a similar percentage awarding damages over $30 million. The
median award level of $30 million and the geometric mean award level of
$21.4 million greatly exceed the award amount selected by judges.
The distribution of the responses depends on which scenario the respon-
dent received. In the case in which the firm was fortunate in that the acci-
dent did not cause more damage than it actually did, jury-eligible respon-
dents who deviated from the $10 million damages amount in setting awards
tended to award levels in excess of $10 million. In contrast, when the com-
pany was unfortunate in that the $10 million damages amount could have
been zero, there is a greater propensity of the subjects to award damages
below the $10 million damages level.
For the judges the few departures from the $10 million damages amount
occurred because of awards exceeding $10 million.34 The larger sample for
I Somewhat surprisingly, there were more large awards when the company was unfortu-
nate in experiencing damages when there was a 90 percent chance of no loss than in the
situation in which the company was fortunate that the damages were not as bad as $100
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the jury-eligible citizens indicates that for this group the frequency of de-
partures from the $10 million award amount does reflect the expected pat-
tern given the character of how the lottery might have turned out. In situa-
tions in which the company was fortunate in that there was a 90 percent
chance of experiencing damages greater than $10 million, over half the
sample awarded a damages amount exceeding $10 million, and 14 percent
of the sample awarded damages below $10 million. For the unfortunate
case in which the company had a 90 percent chance of having no damages
but did in fact experience $10 million in damages, 22 percent of the sample
awarded damages below $10 million, and 44 percent of the sample awarded
damages in excess of $10 million. However, there is much greater cluster-
ing of these awards above $10 million in the $30 million range rather than
the damages amounts of $75 million and $100 million, which were selected
much more often in the fortunate-case scenario. The existence of a damages
lottery often leads jurors to assess damages in excess of the actual damages
amount, irrespective of whether there was a chance of greater or lesser dam-
ages. However, this tendency to award damages exceeding the actual
amount is much greater when there is a chance that the accident could have
been worse than it was. The net result is that potential damages variance
before the accident leads jurors to award higher penalties than would be
warranted based on sound law and economics principles. Jurors anchored
their damages assessments on the worst-case scenario even when it did not
prevail. Judges were not susceptible to this error.
V. SOURCES OF ERROR: RISK BELIEFS AND RISK TRADE-OFFS
What factors might account for the errors of jurors and the comparatively
better performance of a sample of judges? These groups may differ in terms
of how they view risk more generally. Do jurors perceive risk differently,
or is it that they have different valuations of risk for any given level of risk
beliefs? This section will explore differences in mortality risk beliefs and
personal risk-money trade-offs. If there are systematic differences in how
mock jurors and judges address risk issues more generally, that result will
suggest that knowledge of the law alone does not account for differences
in treatment of the accident situations. Two differences are more salient.
First, judges tend to perceive risks more accurately and are less likely to
overestimate low-probability events such as those involved in accident and
product safety contexts. Second, judges are less subject to the zero-risk
mentality of being willing to spend unbounded amounts to achieve small
million. Owing to the small sample of judges deviating from the $10 million amount, this
result may not be consequential. These errors could be due to random misreadings of the
survey.
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reductions in risk. Each of these influences will tend to make juries more
likely to find companies liable and impose substantial damages in accident
contexts.
Consider first how people perceive risk. One of the most well-established
results in the literature on risk and uncertainty is that people overestimate
low-probability events and underestimate larger risks.35 Here I will run a
similar experiment in which judges and jurors rate the total number of fatal-
ities from different causes. Each individual in the sample assessed the total
annual deaths associated with 23 major sources of mortality using an ap-
proach that paralleled that used in the risk perception studies above.
The survey question that the respondents considered with respect to the
mortality risk assessment was the following: "In 1990, 47,000 people in
the United States died in automobile accidents. How many people died
from the other causes of death listed below? You are not expected to know
any of these answers exactly. Your best estimate will do. Fill in your best
estimate in the space." The respondents then considered 23 different causes
of death.
Figure 1 sketches the level of risk beliefs for the juror sample and a sam-
ple of judges as a function of the actual risk level.36 The risk perception
curve for the juror sample is the solid curve. The dashed curve indicates
the comparable relationship for judges. Figure 1 demonstrates the estab-
lished pattern of overperception of small risks and underassessment of large
risks, as respondents tend to overassess risks such as botulism, fireworks
accidents, and lightning strikes. In contrast, the truly substantial hazards
that we face, such as the risks from diabetes, stroke, all forms of cancer,
and heart disease, tend to be underestimated.
It is noteworthy that the risk perception curve for judges is closer to the
45-degree line along which perceived risks equal actual risks almost
throughout the risk range. Judges have more accurate risk beliefs than do
jury-eligible citizens. The relative discrepancy is particularly great for the
large risks, for which the judges have an error in their risk assessments that
is approximately half as great as that of the jurors.
A second critical attribute for determining how individuals will make de-
" See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. Experimental
Psychol. 551 (1978), and M. Granger Morgan, On Judging the Frequency of Lethal Events:
A Replication, 3 Risk Analysis 11 (1983), which found that for a set of mortality risks people
exhibit the systematic patterns of bias noted above. There are, of course, exceptions. Howard
Kunreuther et al., Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons (1978), finds that
some low risks tend to be ignored.
36 These curves were based on estimates of the natural log of perceived risks as a function
of a person-specific intercept and both a linear and quadratic term for the natural log of actual
deaths.
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cisions regarding risk is their risk-money trade-off. The most widely used
measure of this type in the economics literature is the implicit value of life.
This terminology does not refer to the amount one would pay to avoid cer-
tain death. Nor does it pertain to the appropriate level of compensation after
a fatality. Rather, it gives individuals' rate of trade-off between small prob-
abilities of death and money. Economists typically base these estimates ei-
ther on the revealed trade-off in higher wages for a risky job or the lower
prices people pay for more hazardous products. Most of these estimates
based on wage equations cluster in the range of $3-$7 million, with a mid-
point value of $5 million.
37
In order to elicit survey responses that are meaningful, it is essential to
create a credible survey context that will in fact elicit the underlying risk-
money trade-off. United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has
suggested that a particularly useful way to think about value-of-life issues
in general is to ask people how much they would be willing to pay for a
marginally safer car. These personal risk trade-offs can then be used to
guide the individual in thinking about the risk trade-off that corporations
should strive to achieve.38 Survey evidence in the literature regarding hypo-
thetical improvements in automobile safety have yielded estimates for the
implicit value of life comparable to those that have emerged from wage-
job risk studies using actual labor market behavior.39
The specific question that the respondents considered regarding the value
of life was the following:
Suppose you could reduce your annual risk of death in a car crash by 1/10,000.
Thus, if there were 10,000 people just like you, there would be one less expected
death per year in your group. This risk reduction would cut your annual risk of
death in a car crash in half.
How much would you be willing to pay each year either for a safer car or for
improved highway safety measures that would cut your motor vehicle risks in half?
Respondents then considered five different dollar ranges as well as the
possibility of spending an infinite amount on such a safety improvement,
where this was defined as being "all present and future resources." Con-
" For a review of this evidence, see W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and
Health, 21 J. Econ. Literature 1912 (1993); and Viscusi, Rational Risk Policy, supra note 1.
31 See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (1993).
'9 For a review of these studies in comparison to the wage equation literature, see Viscusi,
The Value of Risks to Life and Health, supra note 37. A recent study of the implicit value
of life reflected in used-car purchases, which parallels the case study approach advocated by
Justice Breyer, is that of Mark Dreyfus & W. Kip Viscusi, Rates of Time Preference and
Consumer Valuations of Automobile Safety and Fuel Efficiency, 38 J. Law & Econ. 79
(1995).
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verting responses to an implicit value-of-life measure is a straightforward
exercise. The risk change indicated in the question was a decrease in the
probability of death of 1/10,000. For those who gave finite responses, the
mean implicit value of life of $5.1 million was quite reasonable and in line
with estimates in the literature.
What is disturbing is that almost 10 percent of the juror sample-or 47
respondents-indicated that they had an infinite value-of-life amount. Such
responses indicate a failure to be willing to make such complex risk trade-
offs. In contrast, only 3 percent of the judges indicated an unlimited will-
ingness to pay for greater safety.4" Jurors more than judges fall prey to the
zero-risk mentality and are willing to pay any price to achieve safety. Such
unbounded commitments to safety are not feasible, given the multiplicity
of hazards that we face and the limited resources we have to address them.
A belief in the zero-risk approach will make jurors less willing to accept
the behavior of corporations that make finite risk trade-offs, as in the auto
safety scenarios discussed in Section III.
Thus, in addition to the differences found in the accident scenarios, the
jurors displayed two classes of systematic errors in dealing with risk more
generally. They are more likely to believe that low-probability hazards are
more dangerous than they are. Moreover, in considering risk contexts they
are more susceptible to the zero-risk mentality than are judges. Each of
these sources of error will make jurors more likely to err in a systematic
manner in their liability judgments and damages assessments.
VI. CONCLUSION
Anomalies in individual behavior regarding risk are not restricted to pri-
vate decisions. People's participation in juries also involves consideration
of risk contexts for cases involving accidents. An important question for
assessing the function of our judicial system is how juries in fact approach
such decisions and if their judgments are flawed in a systematic manner.
The results of this study of risk attitudes of jury-eligible citizens and a
comparison of these findings with similar results for judges suggest that ju-
rors particularly fall short of reasonable standards of behavior. Several note-
worthy discrepancies indicated comparatively better performance by
judges. Whereas 74 percent of jurors favored punitive damages in the
small-property-loss airline repair case, only 18 percent of judges did. When
faced with damages resulting from a previous risk lottery, 92 percent of
judges awarded damages equal to the loss, compared with 26 percent of
I In addition, 4 percent of the judges did not respond to the question.
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jurors. Judges had more accurate risk beliefs and were less prone to over-
estimate low-probability events. Few judges were subject to the zero-risk
mentality, whereas 10 percent of the jury-eligible citizens had infinite risk
trade-offs. Overall, judges displayed a greater capacity to think in a bal-
anced manner about the competing concerns pertinent to accident contexts.
These findings raise the more fundamental issue of whether jurors make
risk judgments sensibly when comparing the costs and benefits in risk con-
texts, determining if a firm should be liable for an accident, and assessing
the appropriate level of damages to be levied. Jurors fall substantially short
of what one might hope for in terms of a desired pattern of decisions, partic-
ularly in small-probability, large-loss cases. In situations in which compa-
nies undertake a benefit-cost analyses, jurors pay very little attention to ei-
ther the risk level or the cost per life saved-two key characterizations of
the risk decision from the standpoint of how the company should approach
accident risks to its products. What does matter, consistently, is whether the
corporation undertook a systematic risk analysis but nevertheless proceeded
to market a risky product. Jurors fault companies for thinking systemati-
cally about risk, even in situations in which on the basis of the usual eco-
nomic criteria the firm was not negligent and complied with state-of-the-
art economic evaluation practices employed by the responsible regulatory
agencies. Moreover, sound economic analyses with high values of life are
targeted by jurors for even greater punitive damages.
Jurors also display a particular willingness to boost the level of such
damages when the damages could have been worse but were not. This bias
will make damages awards systematically too high.
The underlying theme throughout these results is not only that jurors
make errors that are inconsistent with the usual law and economics princi-
ples but also that these biases are quite systematic and will generate higher
liability costs for firms. These findings also produced evidence of a zero-
risk mentality, risk overestimation, and undue emphasis on worst-case out-
comes. Anchoring effects were also influential with respect to corporate risk
analyses, as was the role of hindsight bias. The results also were consistent
with evidence suggesting that juror judgments are driven more by an out-
rage model than a careful benefit-cost framework. A variety of such influ-
ences are no doubt operative in these instances as well as in actual cases in
court.
Failure to make sensible risk trade-offs and penalizing companies for
making responsible efforts to trade off risk and cost distort the behavior of
juries from what should be their proper role. Recent research focusing on
punitive damages awards has urged that judges be given more discretion
over complex risk cases, particularly with regard to setting punitive dam-
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ages." The findings here suggest that the case for such a shift in responsibil-
ity has a broadly based cognitive rationale.
Other reform proposals also are potentially consistent with the spirit of
the results here. A sweeping reform possibility that I support is that punitive
damages be eliminated for safety and environmental risks. 2 The underlying
rationale stems from the fact that punitive damages have no apparent incen-
tive effect empirically. Moreover, most of the responsibility for creating
these incentives lies both with market forces and with government regula-
tory agencies, which are better equipped than are juries to deal with the
complex scientific issues that often arise in these areas. A less sweeping
proposal that also. is reflective of the scientific complexities and the need
for technical expertise is Justice Breyer's suggestion that the courts avail
themselves more of scientific experts to assist in illuminating these con-
cems because of the great difficulty that risk issues pose for courts and the
typical juror.43
The results in this article highlight the fact that there is a serious problem
in the way the courts address matters pertaining to health, safety, and envi-
ronmental risks. Numerous other studies have also indicated that there are
many deficiencies in juror deliberations, particularly as they relate to the
determination that punitive damages are warranted and to the mapping of
these concerns into dollar damages amounts. Presumably any reform effort
should also reflect the insights of these many additional contributions as
well. What is clear is that the shortcomings that researchers have identified
in behavior toward risk by individuals also carry over to the courtroom.
APPENDIX
I. THE SURVEY
Below is a summary of the questions in the survey that were the basis for the
analysis in this article. The order of the questions parallels that for the discussion
in the article. For simplicity only one variant of each question is reported, but the
different variations are noted.
Survey Instructions
The survey below consists of a series of questions about safety risks. There are
usually no right or wrong answers. The main purpose of the survey is to get your
4" See Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, supra note 2, for advocacy of delegating in-
creased responsibility over punitive damages to judges as well as the documentation of the
errors that occur as jurors map their concerns regarding the behavior of defendants into dollar
punitive damages amounts.
42 See Viscusi, supra note 8.
3 See Breyer, supra note 38.
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opinion on a variety of safety problems. If you do not know an answer, please pro-
vide your best estimate.
Several of the questions deal with punitive damages for safety decisions. As you
may recall, courts may award punitive damages for conduct that is reckless. A com-
pany is reckless if it is conscious of a grave danger or risk of harm, it evaluated the
danger, it disregarded the risk when deciding how to act, and its conduct involved a
gross deviation from the level of care an ordinary person would use. In the punitive
damages cases discussed below, courts will separately award compensatory dam-
ages to meet the income losses associated with the accident.
II. AIRPLANE REPAIR CASE
Four versions of the airline repair case were tested. Two involved property dam-
age of $15,000 and $1.5 million, and two involved personal injury of $150 million
and $1.5 billion. One property damage scenario and one personal injury scenario
appear below.
A. Property Damage Scenario
You are CEO of Rocky Mountain Airlines. The cargo door on a plane does not
operate properly. Fixing it costs $2,000. If it is not fixed, there is absolutely no
safety risk. Very reliable engineering estimates indicate that there is only a 1/10
chance that there will be a total loss to your company of $15,000 due to in materials
damage to cargo over the life of the plane. Thus, there is a 90 percent chance that
there will be no damage whatsoever. Your company has no insurance but will be
liable for the cost of this damage. Should you undertake the repair? Circle one.
Repair Do Not Repair
If you do not undertake the repair and there is luggage damage, should the court
award punitive damages? Punitive damages represent a payment the company must
make in addition to compensating people for their losses to punish the company.
Circle one.
Yes No
B. Personal Injury Scenario
You are CEO of Rocky Mountain Airlines. The cargo door on a plane does not
operate properly. Fixing it costs $2,000. If it is not fixed, there is a remote chance
that the problem with the door will cause the plane to crash. Very reliable engi-
neering estimates indicate that there is only a 1/ 1,000,000 chance over the expected
life of the plane that the plane will crash, killing an estimated 29 people. Thus,
there is a 999,999/1,000,000 chance that there will be no loss of life whatsoever.
The best economic estimates are that a crash will cost your company $150 million,
which includes the full social value of life. Your parent company has no insurance
but does have sufficient resources to pay these damages. Should you undertake the
repair? Circle one.
Repair Do Not Repair
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If you do not undertake the repair and there is a crash, should punitive damages
be awarded? Circle one.
Yes No
III. CORPORATE RISK ANALYSIS
There were five corporate risk analysis cases, each of which was done for situa-
tions with 10 deaths and four deaths per year. For simplicity, I report only one ex-
ample of no-analysis scenario 2, analysis scenario 3, and NHTSA analysis sce-
nario 4.
A. Scenario 2
A major auto company with annual profits of $7 billion made a line of cars with
a defective electrical system design. This failure has led to a series of fires in these
vehicles that caused 4 burn deaths per year. Changing the design to prevent these
deaths would cost $4 million for the 40,000 vehicles affected per year. This safety
design change would raise the price of cars by $100 each. The company thought
that there might be some risk from the current design, but did not believe that it
would be significant. The company notes that even with these injuries, the vehicle
had one of the best safety records in its class.
The courts have awarded each of the victims' families $800,000 in damages to
compensate them for the income loss and pain and suffering that resulted. After
these lawsuits, the company altered future designs to eliminate the problem.
1. Should the court also award punitive damages to punish the company for reck-
less behavior?
Yes No





(e) Other amount you select
B. Scenario 3
A major auto company with annual profits of $7 billion made a line of cars with
a defective electrical system design. This failure has led to a series of fires in these
vehicles that caused 4 burn deaths per year. Changing the design to prevent these
deaths would cost $4 million for the 40,000 vehicles affected per year. This safety
design change would raise the price of cars $100 each. The company thought that
there might be some risk from the design, but did not believe that it would be sig-
nificant.
The company did a detailed analysis of the risk and estimated that 4 people
would die each year. However, the company estimated that the liability cost would
only be $800,000 per death based on the median award all industries pay for
product-related fatalities. The company's estimate of the total court awards for the
design problem was $3.2 million per year. As a result, the company estimated that
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the $4 million annual cost of making the change exceeded the estimated value of
the court awards. The company concluded that it was cheaper not to adopt the safer
design. The company notes that even with these injuries, the vehicle had one of the
best safety records in its class.
The courts have awarded each of the victims' families $800,000 in damages to
compensate them for the income loss and pain and suffering that resulted. The com-
pensatory damages awards to the families were in line with the company's esti-
mates, or $800,000 per death. After these lawsuits, the company altered future de-
signs to eliminate the problem.
1. Should the court also award punitive damages to punish the company for reck-
less behavior?
Yes No





(e) Other amount you select
C. Scenario 4
A major auto company with annual profits of $7 billion made a line of cars with
a defective electrical system design. This failure has led to a series of fires in these
vehicles that caused 4 burn deaths per year. Changing the design to prevent these
deaths would cost $16 million for the 40,000 vehicles affected per year. This safety
design would raise the price of cars $400 each. The company thought that there
might be some risk from the design, but did not believe that it would be significant.
The company did a detailed analysis of the risk and estimated that 4 people
would die on average per year. However, the cost to eliminate the risk was $4 mil-
lion per fatality prevented. To determine whether the safety improvement was
worthwhile, the company used a value of $3 million per accidental death, which is
the value used by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in setting
auto safety standards. The company estimated that the annual safety benefits of the
safer design would be $12 million (4 expected deaths at $3 million per death), while
the costs would be $16 million. As a result, the company believed that other safety
improvements might save more lives at less cost. The company notes that even with
these injuries, the vehicle had one of the best safety records in its class,
The courts have awarded each of the victims' families $800,000 in damages to
compensate them for the income loss and pain and suffering that resulted. After the
deaths occurred, the company altered future designs to eliminate the problem.
1. Should the court also award punitive damages to punish the company for reck-
less behavior?
Yes No
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(e) Other amount you select
IV. OIL WELL BLOWOUT
The oil well blowout damages case had two variations, one in which damages
were less than the worst case and one in which damages equaled the worst case.
A. Fortunate Case
Acme Oil Company has been found that it did not meet legal standards for safe
operation of its oil wells. Consequently, it is liable for an oil well blowout that
caused $10 million in property damage and no personal injury. The company in
many respects was fortunate in that such blowouts have a 90% chance of $100 mil-
lion in property damages and a 10% chance of minor damage of $10 million. What
damages, award amount would you select?
El Zero
El Under $10 million
El $10 million
El Between $10 million and $50 million
El Between $50 million and $100 million
El $100 million
B. Unfortunate Case
Acme Oil Company has been found that it did not meet the legal standards for
safe operation of its oil wells. Consequently, it is liable for an oil well blowout that
caused $10 million in property damage and no personal injury. The company in
many respects was unfortunate in that such blowouts have a 90% chance of no dam-
age and a 10% chance of $10 million in damages. What damages award amount
would you select?
El Zero
El Under $10 million
El $10 million
El Between $10 million and $50 million
El Between $50 million and $100 million
El $100 million
V. RISK TRADE-OFFS AND BELIEFS
A. Value of Life
Suppose you could reduce you annual risk of death in a car crash by 1/10,000.
Thus, if there were 10,000 people just like you, there would be one less expected
death per year in your group. This risk reduction would cut your annual risk of
death in a car crash in half.
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How much would you be willing to pay each year either for a safer car or for








El Infinite-All present and future resources
B. Risk Assessment
In 1990 47,000 people in the United States died in automobile accidents. How
many people died from the other causes of death listed below? You are not ex-
pected to know any of these answers exactly. Your best estimate will do.
























All causes of death
VI. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Please answer the following background characteristic questions. The answers
will not be used to identify you. They will, however, be useful in seeing how the
responses to the survey vary across the population.
What is your sex?
El Male El Female
What is your age?
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Which category best describes your smoking status?
Current smoker (average at least I cigarette per day)
___ Former smoker
Nonsmoker

















Some high school .037 .189
High school graduate .186 .389
Some college .401 .491
College graduate .269 .444
Professional degree .107 .310
Smoking status:
Current smoker .225 .418






NOTE.-The sample size for this table is 489, as there were four
observations for which the respondents did not report their per-
sonal characteristics. The total sample size was 493.
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